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POTENTIAL EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYEE
REFERENCES
I. INTRODUCTION
Employers are having second thoughts about giving employee refer-
ences.' Until recently, prior employers willingly passed on significant
amounts of employee information to prospective employers.' However,
the increasing propensity of individuals and companies to sue over unde-
sirable3 or inadequate 4 references has made many employers reluctant to
give out frank and detailed references. As courts continue to explore pri-
vacy5 and employee rights,6 employers will be forced to weigh the benefits
1. See, e.g., Johnson, Why References Aren't 'Available Upon Request A New Fear of
Lawsuits Is Tightening Everyone's Lips, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1985 § 3 (Magazine), at 8,
col. 2.
2. "Over the last two centuries the number of employer references ... has increased dra-
matically. References for former employees are now written in the millions." Comment,
Qualified Privilege to Defame Employees and Credit Applicants, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
143, 146 (1977) [hereinafter Comment, Qualified Privilege]. While no studies have been
made on the annual number of employer references given, studies have shown that 50 to 90
percent of employers do solicit references. Id. at 146 n.18. The number of reports which
concern an investigation into an employee's background is unclear. Feldman, The Fair
Credit Reporting Act-From the Regulator's Vantage Point, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 459
(1974). One estimate is that 35 million Americans have had their careers monitored by pri-
vate personnel investigators. Comment, Qualified Privilege, supra, at 147 n.21 (citing AFL-
CIO Maritime Trades Dept., Credit Bureaus: A Private Intelligence Network, AM. FEDERA-
TIONIST Apr. 1971, at 9, reprinted in Fair Credit Reporting Act-1973: Hearings on S.2360
Before the Subcomm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 956
(1973)). At least one author has recognized that employers need to check references to avoid
the possibility of employees misrepresenting their background. Davidson, Checking Refer-
ences, 27 LAW OFF. EcoN. & MGMT. 45, 45 (1986).
3. Employees may bring suit following a false reference. See, e.g., Stuempges v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980) (employee filed defamation action against em-
ployer after false statements were given in a reference).
4. See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 361 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (plaintiff employees filed suit for defamation against their employer for inadequately
describing their reason for termination).
5. Although a legal interest in an individual's right to privacy has been recognized in the
United States for many years, during the last fifteen years privacy concerns have become
acute, provoking a social response that has been termed a "privacy revolution." See Miller,
The Privacy Revolution: A Report from the Barricades, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1-22 (1979);
see also Duff & Johnson, A Renewed Employee Right to Privacy, 34 LAB. L.J. 747 (1983).
6. "Development of employee rights has forced employers to take a closer look at their
policies regarding information gathering and dissemination." Duffy, Defamation and Em-
ployer Privilege, 9 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS L.J. No. 3, 444, 444 (1984). Workers have exper-
ienced a continual judical expansion of employee rights. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1489 (1985) (a public employee has a right to respond to charges
prior to termination of employment); California Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Guerra, 760 F.2d 274
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of providing references' against the possibility of defending a costly
lawsuit."
This comment gives a broad overview of the grounds on which employ-
ees, their prospective employers and third parties file reference lawsuits.
It will begin by discussing the causes of action asserted by former em-
ployees. Employees bring suits based on defamation,9 discrimination
charges,"0 or alleged interference with prospective employment.1 An em-
ployee may also assert a claim for intentional infliction of emotional harm
arising out of the employer's dissemination of a negative reference. 2 This
comment will then discuss employees' suits based on violations of state
statutes 3 enacted to protect individuals with respect to the information
given out by their employers.
The comment will conclude by examining an employer's liability to
subsequent employers, former employees and third parties based on a
(9th Cir. 1985) (employees returning from pregnancy and childbirth leave have a right to be
reinstated), noted in 2 LAB. & EMPLOYMENT LAW NEWSLETTER No. 5, at 12 (May 1985);
Klayman, Regulation 1977.12: The Right to Say No to Exposure to Work Conditions that
Pose an Immediate Threat to Employee Safety, 59 U. DEw. J. URB. L. 185 (1982); Comment,
Employees Right to Representation at Investigatory Interviews, 25 B.C.L. REV. 127 (1983);
Walker, Employee Access to Personnel Files: An Emerging Trend, 1 LAB. & EMPLOYMENT
LAW NEWSLETTER No. 6, at 18 (Oct. 1984).
7. Disseminating references may be viewed as a public service of an employer. Further-
more, references benefit employers by imposing "social controls" on employees.
"[E]mployers could still use the reward of a good recommendation to motivate employees"
and the threat of a bad reference to deter misconduct. Comment, Qualified Privilege, supra
note 2, at 171 n.169.
8. "The cost of litigation has increased at an alarming rate." Janofsky, Reducing Court
Costs and Delay, 71 ILL. B.J. 94, 96 (Oct. 1982); see Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer &
Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983) (outlining a de-
tailed mathematical cost analysis of current litigation expenses for individuals and
businesses).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 15-41.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 42-54.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 93-112.
12. An employee's claims arising from an unfavorable employer reference may often in-
clude a claim based on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g.,
Lekich v. International Business Machs. Corp., 469 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Campos v.
Oldsmobile Div., General Motors Corp., 71 Mich. App. 23, 246 N.W.2d 352 (1976) (discuss-
ing the difference between a cause of action for slander and for intentional infliction of
mental distress); Burba v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 90 A.D.2d 984, 456 N.Y.S.2d 578
(1982); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977) (al-
though no employee reference is mentioned in the case, plaintiff's alleged cause of action
was based on employer's post-employment comments regarding plaintiff). This article will
not discuss this cause of action. For more information, see generally Annotation, Modern
Status of Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress as Independent Tort; "Outrage," 38
A.L.R. 4th 999 (1985); W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 12, at 54-66 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
13. See infra text accompanying notes 55-88.
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claim of misrepresentation.14 This cause of action is brought to recover
for the pecuniary or physical harm incurred as a result of reliance on in-
formation provided in or missing from a reference.
The cause of action most frequently asserted as the result of an em-
ployer's reference is defamation. The potential liability to be incurred for
alleged defamation has caused many employers to reconsider the em-
ployee references they are willing to offer.
II. EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR DEFAMATION
A former employer's unfavorable reference may significantly impair an
employee's chance at later employment. Accordingly, employee references
create a fertile source for defamation15 lawsuits. An employer's potential
liability for defamation is thus causing employers to take a cautious look
at the employee references they are willing to disseminate.'"
A. The Employer's Qualified Privilege to Give an Accurate Reference
An employer has a qualified privilege17 to make good faith statements"
14. See infra text accompanying notes 113-45.
15. Defamation is the false communication about another that "tends so to harm [the]
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third
persons from associating ... with him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977); see,
e.g., Adams v. Lawson, 191 Va. (17 Gratt.) 250, 255 (1867) (any language which "tends to
injure the reputation ... or to reflect shame and disgrace on the plaintiff"). See generally
PROSSER, supra note 12, § 111; 50 AM. JuRa. 2D Libel & Slander § 1 (1970).
In order for a statement to be considered defamatory it must be communicated to some-
one other than the plaintiff and must be false. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 111. Truth is a
complete defense and "true statements however disparaging, are not actionable." Stuempges
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980). If the defamation is written or
fixed in a tangible form, such as film, it is called libel; if it is oral or made by a transitory
gesture, it is called slander. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 112. Each state may require different
proof and may allow different damage awards according to whether the statement was libel
or slander. "Unlike most states, Virginia makes no distinction between actions for libel and
those for slander." Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 889, 275 S.E.2d 632, 635 (1981), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 3513 (1985) (citing Shupe v. Rose's Stores, 213 Va. 374, 375-76, 192
S.E.2d 766, 767 (1972)); see also, Note, Defamation in Virginia-A Merger of Libel and
Slander, 47 VA. L. REv. 1116 (1961). Slanders affecting the plaintiff in business, trade, office
or calling are slanders per se and thus actionable without any proof of actual damages.
Anderson v. Kammeer, 262 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. 1977); PROSSER, supra note 12, § 112.
16. Numerous sources have discussed a cause of action based on libel and slander arising
from an employee reference. See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 6, at 444; Comment, Qualified Priv-
ilege, supra note 2, at 146; Note, Master's Defamation of His Servants, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REv. 332 (1969) (presentation of topic is still current). See generally Annotation, Defama-
tion: Loss of Employer's Qualified Privilege to Publish Employee's Work Record or Qualifi-
cation, 24 A.L.R. 4TH 144 (1983); 50 AM. Ju. 2D Libel & Slander §§ 114-16 (1970). There-
fore, this comment will briefly overview employee's defamation claims as discussed in recent
cases.
17. "Statements made by an employer ... to one with a legitimate interest in the subject
19871 429
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to a prospective employer 9 concerning the services and character of a
current or former employee.2 0 Courts grant this qualified privilege to in-
duce fair comment and criticism. 1 The privilege is a "qualified" one be-
cause only the truthful statements of the speaker are protected from ac-
tions for redress. The qualified privilege benefits the recipient by
requiring the disclosure of truthful, relevant information.
For example, in Stuempges v. Parke Davis & Co.,22 the court held that
an employer's statements about the work record of a former employee
were privileged when the statements were made in good faith to a party
with a legitimate interest in the subject matter. After the defendant em-
ployer had demonstrated the existence of a qualified privilege, the plain-
[matter] are conditionally privileged so long as they are made in good faith." Stuempges,
297 N.W.2d at 254. Qualified privilege results when the speaker communicates in the "dis-
charge of a public or private duty, legal or moral." Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders, 113
Va. 156, 161, 73 S.E. 472, 476 (1912). This privilege is conditional or qualified because it can
be lost if abused. Robinson v. Lescrenier, 721 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1983); Scholtes v. Signal
Delivery Serv., 548 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982). For a general discussion of the qualified
privilege see Note, Qualified Privilege as a Defense to Defamation, 45 VA. L. REv. 772
(1959); PROSSER, supra note 12, § 115.
18. Even if a reference does not speak favorably of a former employee, an employer will
not be liable if the statement was made with good faith in its truth and accuracy. A "publi-
cation which is . . .privileged is one made in good faith." Cook v. East Shore Newspapers,
327 Ill. App. 559, -, 64 N.E.2d 751, 760 (1946).
19. A privileged communication must be made to a party with a reasonable interest in the
information, or with "reciprocal duties or responsibilities pertaining to or in the subject
matter" of the communication. M. Rosenburg & Sons, Inc. v. Craft, 182 Va. 512, 519, 29
S.E.2d 375, 380 (1944); see also McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
Toomer v. Breaux, 146 So. 2d 723 (La. Ct. App. 1962). See generally 50 Ahl. JuR. 2D Libel &
Slander § 275 (1970).
20. A statement must be confined to relevant subject matter. For example, inclusion of
non-work related information, e.g. racial class, scandalous family background, etc., in re-
sponse to a reference inquiry exceeds the scope of the privilege. Otherwise, anything said or
written by a master concerning the character of a former servant is a privileged communica-
tion. Williams Printing Co., 113 Va. at 157, 73 S.E. at 476; accord Kroger Co. v. Young, 210
Va. 564, 567, 172 S.E.2d 720, 722 (1970). But see Stewart v. Nation-wide Check Corp., 279
N.C. 278, 182 S.E.2d 410 (1971) (employer's statement to a party who had a family connec-
tion with discharged employee was not qualifiedly privileged); Harrison v. Arrow Metal
Prod. Corp., 20 Mich. App. 570, 174 N.W.2d 875 (1969) (held that an employer's communi-
cations to prospective employers are not protected with any privilege).
21. Note, Torts-Libel and Slander-Defenses of Qualified [Sic] Privilege and Fair
Comment, 41 N.C.L. REv. 153 (1962). The qualified privilege attempts to balance society's
interest in protecting individuals against inaccurate statements that harm their reputation,
and thereby injure their career, against society's interest in facilitating the flow of informa-
tion so that employers can make wise hiring decisions. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (the defamation action protects plaintiff's right to be free from defama-
tory falsehood); Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 257. The law recognizes that the benefits of the
free flow of employee reference information outweighs the potential harm to the employee.
Geslewitz, Reviewing Personnel Practices and Documents to Avoid the Risk of Litigation,
32 PRAc. LAW. 75, 86-87 (Jan. 1986); see also Note, supra note 17, at 779.
22. 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1980).
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tiff employee only needed to demonstrate that the employer's statement2 3
was false or uttered with malice to recover compensatory and punitive
damages.2 4 The plaintiff recovered by showing that his former employer
had wrongfully exceeded the qualified privilege.
Proof of malice2 5 destroys the qualified privilege of the employer who
gives the reference. For example, in Wynn v. Cole,2" the allegedly defama-
tory statements27 were protected by a qualified privilege in the "absence
23. The employer had stated that the employee was a poor salesperson and was not in-
dustrious and that he was fired because he sold on friendship, would not get products out,
was hard to motivate and could not sell. Id. at 255.
24. A plaintiff employee does not need to prove an express defamatory statement on the
part of the defendant employer in order to recover.
In an action for slander, nature of damages to be awarded is determined by the type
of slander involved, if 'slander per se,' in which slander is accomplished by very words
spoken, general compensatory damages will be presumed, but when slander is 'slan-
der per quod,' in which slander results from listener's interpretation of words through
innuendo, general compensatory damages must be alleged and proved in order for
plaintiff to recover at all, and punitive damages may be awarded in either case, but
only upon the finding of actual damages, and nominal damages may be awarded even
if no actual loss is proven.
Rainey v. Shaffer, 8 Ohio App. 3d 262, 456 N.E.2d 1328 (1983) (plaintiff was unable to
recover because she could not prove that the prospective employer inferred that she was a
thief from the statements of her former employer).
25. As early as 1786, an employee could not maintain a defamation action against an
employer unless the statement was "malicious." See generally Annotation, Statement with
Reference to Discharge from Private Employment as Actionable Per Se, 66 A.L.R. 1499,
1506 (1952) (citing Weatherstron v. Hawkins, 99 Eng. Rep. 1001 (1786)). Since then, courts
consistently have held that an employer's qualified privilege is destroyed if a statement is
made maliciously or with an intent to injure. See, e.g., Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv.,
Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Cole v. Cooper, 437 So. 2d 1257 (Ala. 1983); Bat-
tista v. Chrysler Corp., 454 A.2d 286 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982); Kroger Co., 210 Va. at 569, 172
S.E.2d at 723; see also Annotation, supra note 15, at 156. The burden is on the plaintiff to
prove malice. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Dixon, 575 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978). But see Galvin v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 341 Mass. 293, 168 N.E.2d 262 (1960)
(although there was insufficient evidence to prove malice on behalf of defendant employer,
the court still found an abuse of the qualified privilege). For a discussion of this case see
Rapacz, Torts-Massachusetts Finds Abuse of Qualified Privilege Without Proof of Malice
in Slander Case, 10 DE PAUL L. REv. 222 (1960).
Communicating with malice means communicating with ill-will or spite. Malice may be
express or inferred from defendant's unreasonable conduct. Malice traditionally has been
left to state courts to define. Duffy, supra note 6, at 447; see Comment, Tort
Law-Conditional Privilege for Defamatory Statements in Legitimate Business Communi-
cation-Bratt v. International Business Machines Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 467 N.E.2d 126
(1984), 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 176, 178-83 (1985) (discussing the standard for malice to be
applied to conditionally privileged communications). For an excellent discussion of the mal-
ice standard in Virginia, see The Gazette v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713, cert. denied,
105 S.C. 3513, 3528 (1985). See also Spahn, Libel and Slander in Virginia, 17 U. RiCH. L.
REv. 769, 779-83 (1983).
26. 91 Mich. App. 517, 284 N.W.2d 144 (1979).
27. The employer had commented that plaintiff, "did not really apply herself to the best
of her abilities. Eager to get on the bandwagon if trouble existed." Id. at -, 284 N.W.2d at
1987]
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of any evidence of malice."2 Testimony indicating that the employer did
not like the employee was insufficient to raise the inference of actual mal-
ice, i.e., that the statements were made "with knowledge that statements
were false or with reckless disregard for their truth."2 9 As stated in
Stuempges, the state of mind of the employer making allegedly defama-
tory statements is "more significant than whether he knew that what he
was saying was false."'3 0 The underlying basis for this rule is the impor-
tance of protecting the job seeker from malicious undercutting by a for-
mer employer.
In addition to the inability to show malice, truth is a complete defense
in a defamation action. True statements, however disparaging, are not
actionable.3 1
B. The Recent Trend Toward Reducing the Qualified Privilege Ex-
tended to Employers
Recently, courts have been narrowing the scope of employers' qualified
privilege to comment on employees. 32 Several cases demonstrate the em-
ployer's increased risk of liability.
Today, an employer who refuses to give a reference can be sued for
defamation by the former employee. For example, in Lewis v. Equitable
Life Assurance Society of the United States,33 an employer who refused
145.
28. Id. at -, 284 N.W.2d at 147.
29. Id. (recognizing the commonly accepted standard for actual malice in similar situa-
tions). This standard also applies for public employees suing public employers. McKinley v.
Baden, 777 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1985).
30. Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 258.
31. Id. at 252.
32. "In its term that ended on July 2 [1985] ... the [U.S. Supreme Court] Justices came
down on the side of the plaintiff and narrowed First Amendment protection for a person
expressing false and harmful views." Maskowitz, The Court Sends Mixed Signals on Free
Speech, Bus. WK. 40 (July 15, 1985); see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green Moss Builders,
Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985) (the Court confirmed an award of $300,000 in punitive damages
against defendant credit reporting agency for incorrectly reporting to five subscribers that
plaintiff construction contractor had filed for bankruptcy); McDonald v. Smith, 105 S. Ct.
2787 (1985) (holding that a businessman could not claim absolute immunity from a libel suit
based on letters he wrote to President Reagan urging that a former state judge not be ap-
pointed as U.S. Attorney); Arbetman & Hayman, The Court Takes Another Look at Protec-
tion for Defendants in Defamation Cases, PREVIEW No. 1, at 18 (1985); see also Great
Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 150, 334 S.E.2d 846, 850 (1985) (recognizing
the holding in Dun & Bradstreet that "in light of the reduced constitutional value of speech
involving no matters of public concern,. . . the state interest [in compensating private indi-
viduals for injury to reputation] adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive dam-
ages-even absent a showing of [New York Times] malice." 105 S. Ct. at 2946).
33. 361 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), rev'd in part, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
For a discussion of the case, see Feerick, Employee Defamation, 194 N.Y.L.J. 1 (Oct. 4,
1985).
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to comment on four former employees was found liable for defamation.
The plaintiffs contended that the employer's refusal to provide an expla-
nation for the employees' discharge to future employers forced the em-
ployees to explain the circumstances themselves. The employees had been
fired for what the employer termed "gross insubordination" resulting
from their refusal to alter expense accounts to reflect a lower amount
than was actually expended. The court concluded that the- employees
could sue for defamation even though they actually had disseminated the
fact that they had been fired for "gross insubordination. '34 The court rea-
soned that the defamation suit could be brought since the employees were
strongly compelled to repeat the defamatory statements.35 While the
Minnesota Court of Appeals acknowledged that the ruling could have a
significant impact on employers, the court nevertheless awarded almost
one million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages.3 The Su-
preme Court of Minnesota upheld the decision but reduced the award of
damages by eliminating the award for punitive damages.37
Additionally, an employer may be sued for giving inadequate or vague
references. For example, in Carney v. Memorial Hospital & Nursing
Home,3 8 a doctor sued his employer hospital for telling a prospective em-
ployer that he had been discharged "for cause." The doctor alleged that
the hospital's statement was untrue and was intended to injure him in his
profession by indicating that he was incompetent to perform professional
duties. Despite the statement's vagueness, the court allowed the plaintiff
to prove the damages arising from this allegedly defamatory statement.
An employer can also be found liable for defamation because the refer-
ence given, although detailed and accurate, lacks a complete description
of all the reasons supporting termination of employment. In O'Brien v.
34. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 888.
35. Several courts have recognized an exception to the general rule that a defendant can-
not be liable for defamation when the statement in question was published to a third person
only by the plaintiff. This exception applies to compelled self-publication in the context of
employment discharges. See, e.g., McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787,
168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1980); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839, 38 S.E.2d 306
(1946); Belcher v. Little, 315 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa 1982); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich App.
452, 168 N.W.2d 389 (1969).
36. Lewis, 361 N.W.2d at 881. While the court recognized the implications of the decision,
the court felt the impact of the decision would only fall upon "employers whose communica-
tions demonstrate dishonesty and malice." Id. at 881.
37. Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 891-92. The court overturned the award of punitive damages
reasoning that such awards may tend to encourage self-compelled publications and result in
employer's refusing to state the reasons for an employee's discharge. Id. at 892.
38. 64 N.Y.2d 770, 475 N.E.2d 451, 485 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1985). The court rejected defend-
ant hospital's argument that "for cause" meant only that the hospital had "reason," which
may or may not have been valid, for dismissing plaintiff and held that the statement "for
cause" may be susceptible to defamatory connotations. Id. at -, 475 N.E.2d at 453, 485
N.Y.S.2d at 986.
1987]
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Papa Gino's of America, Inc.,3 9 the employer truthfully stated in re-
sponse to a request for a reference that the employee "was terminated for
drug use." According to the findings of the jury, the employee's discharge
was substantially caused by polygraph test results which indicated that
the employee used illegal drugs. 40 The jury also found that the discharge
was caused by the employer's desire to retaliate for the employee's failure
to hire the son of his supervisor. The court found that the employer's
omission of its own retaliatory motives against the employee was "pur-
poseful misrepresentation." '4 1 This intentional misrepresentation substan-
tiated the plaintiffs claim of malice required to defeat the employer's
qualified privilege. The employee was awarded $50,000 for the defamation
claim.
These cases illustrate a trend toward an increasing likelihood of an em-
ployee being able to hold an employer liable for almost any statement
made in the employee reference context. The cases indicate the recent
narrowing of an employer's qualified privilege. As demonstrated in both
O'Brien and Lewis, an employer's policy of disseminating references on
its employees can lead to a costly defamation lawsuit. Carney demon-
strates that the employer can be liable even when no statement was made
by the employer.
III. REFERENCE SUITS BASED ON DISCRIMINATION
A. Intentional Dissemination of Adverse References in an Effort to
Promote Discrimination by an Employer
Suits which allege that the employer discriminated by providing unfa-
vorable references can be brought under civil rights laws,'42 particularly
39. 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986).
40. Id. at 1073.
41. Id.
42. Forty-six states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and the District of Columbia have
adopted statutes that prohibit job discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex or na-
tional origin. 1 EMPL. COORDINATOR (Research Inst. Am.) 70,022-24 (June 17, 1985) (the four
states that lack such coverage include: Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Virginia). Forty-
six states prohibit job discrimination on the basis of age. Id. at 70,027-28 (those states lack-
ing coverage include: Alabama, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Wyoming). Only Delaware ex-
pressly prohibits job discrimination on the basis of marital status. Id. at 70,028-29.
Virginia has various limited statutes requiring equal pay, VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.6 (Repl.
Vol. 1981), prohibiting job discrimination based on physical handicap, id. § 50.01-41 (Cum.
Supp. 1986), prohibiting discrimination with regard to race, color, sex, religion and national
origin in working on government contracts, id. §§ 2.1-376, -376.1 (Repl. Vol. 1979 and Cum.
Supp. 1986) and creating the Equal Employment Opportunity Committee to assure equal
opportunities to state employees without regard to race, color, religion, national origin, po-
litical affiliation, handicap, sex or age, id. § 2.1-116.10 (Repl. Vol. 1979). However, Virginia
has no broad-based fair employment statute of general applicability.
[Vol. 21:427
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.43 It is an unlawful employment
practice to disseminate adverse references in order to promote discrimi-
nation.44 However, an employee has the difficult burden of showing that
the motivation for the employer's wrongful conduct was actually discrimi-
natory in nature.45 An example of an employer deliberately distributing
discriminatory references is found in Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Poto-
mac Telephone Co.4s Plaintiff alleged that the references were untrue and
contained damaging accounts of her employment qualifications because of
her gender and her husband's Arabic descent. The court found sufficient
discriminatory intent to allow her to proceed with her claim.47 The court
stated that "[d]enial of employment on grounds of sex or national origin
is as repugnant to the legislative goal [of Title VII] when induced by a
former employer as when perpetrated directly by an employer with whom
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2000h-6 (1983). Title VII bars discrimination in employment on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. The act provides that: It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for any employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). Title VII
protects former employees even though the literal language of the statute says it applies
only to "employees or applicants for employment." Id. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1) -(2)(a)(2) (1982).
The statute prohibits discrimination related to or arising from the employment relationship,
whether or not the person discriminated against is an employee at the time of discrimina-
tory conduct. Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1978); Rutherford
v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977); see Annotation, Dissemina-
tion of Adverse Employment References by Former Employer as Unlawful Employment
Practice Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1)), 50 A.L.R.
Fed. 722 (1980).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982); see e.g., London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811,
818 (9th Cir. 1981); Silver v. Mohasco Corp., 602 F.2d 1083, 1090-91 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd. on
other grounds, 447 U.S. 807 (1980). If an employee is terminated for good cause, then it will
not be a violation of Title VII for an employer to provide prospective employers with unfa-
vorable references. Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 595 F.2d 711, 723 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). Many employers have a policy of giving out only dates of work and past salary
information for reference checks. An employer who deviates from this policy and issues an
unfavorable opinion reference for a former employee discharged for good cause may face
charges of disparate treatment that permit an inference of discriminatory intent. See EEOC
COMPL. MAN. (BNA) § 602.5(a) (June 1986).
45. The employer's actions must be motivated by a prohibited animus. Silver, 602 F.2d
1083 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 447 U.S. 807 (1980); Ferguson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 443 F. Supp.
1334 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afl'd mem., 607 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1979); Tarvesian v. Carr Div. of
T.R.W., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 336 (D. Mass. 1976). The employee need not prove that the trait
upon which discrimination is based was a substantial or determining factor in the alleged
wrongful employer communication, but only that the discriminatory trait was taken into
account. The employee only must show that the discriminatory trait had "more likely [than
not]" influenced the communication. Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1327 (1985) (Lay, J.
concurring) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981)).
46. 595 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
47. Id. at 723.
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a job is sought. 48
B. The Unlawful Dissemination of Adverse References in Retaliation
for a Discrimination Complaint Lodged by the Employee
Title VII expressly prohibits an employer from disseminating unfavora-
ble references in retaliation for an employee's prior complaint of discrimi-
nation in the workplace.49 This "anti-retaliation" provision allows em-
ployees to participate in Title VII claims against employers without fear
of derogatory or unfair future references.50 For example, in Bilka v.
Pepe's Inc.,51 an employee alleged that the employer fired him on the
basis of national origin. The court held that the employer had violated
Title VII by disseminating negative references in retaliation for bringing
discrimination charges. 2 The court found that the anti-retaliation clause
of Title VII "was plainly written to protect employees who assert Title
VII rights. 53 Accordingly, employers face liability not only for giving a
discriminatory reference but also for any negative reference given in re-
taliation for an employee's complaint of discriminatory practices in the
workplace.5 4
48. Id. at 721.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) provides that:
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees or applicants for employment because he has opposed any prac-
tice made an unlawful employment practice . . .or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.
See Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1978) (employer's refusal to pro-
vide an employee with a reference in retaliation for filing charges violates Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision); Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir.
1977) (act of defendant former employer in advising prospective employer that plaintiff em-
ployee had filed a sex discrimination charge against defendant was a retaliatory act and, as
such, a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)); Czaenowski v. Desoto, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1252,
1259 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (unlawful retaliation where an employer discharges an employee for
good cause, and then provides a reference that knowingly contains false and grossly exagger-
ated unfavorable information after the employee complains of discrimination); Fed. Reg.
Empl. Serv. (Law. Co-op) §§ 2:1-2:3 (Aug. 1984).
50. The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII "was obviously written to prevent employ-
ers from chilling employee's assertions of Title VII rights, and the section should be read
broadly." Bilka v. Pepe's Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
51. Id. at 1254.
52. Id. at 1258-59.
53. Id. at 1259.
54. Additional information needed to bring a reference suit based on Title VII violations
is beyond the scope of this comment. For a more extensive treatment, see 9A Empl. Coordi-
nator (Research Inst. Am.) 98,601 (Dec. 17, 1984); [Job Discrimination] Fed. Reg. Empl.
Serv. (Law. Co-op) 31:1-4:71 (Aug. 1984); 1-4A A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION § 1.0-121.24 (1985); Feiger & Lawson, Evaluation of an Employment Discrimi-
nation Case: The Plaintiff's Perspective, 15 J. MAR. L. REv. 621 (1982); Saperstein & Sinis-
calco, Employment Discrimination Claims, 2 CAL. LAW. 30 (Nov. 1982); Annotation, supra
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IV. STATUTORY REGULATION OF EMPLOYEE REFERENCES
A. Regulation by State Legislatures
1. Blacklisting
An employee's rights concerning references often are governed by state
law.5 5 Many state statutes prohibit employers from impeding a former
employee's search for subsequent employment.56 In Virginia, an em-
ployer's conduct must be "willful and malicious" 57 to be actionable. Other
states, such as California, require only that the conduct amount to "mis-
representation. 5' An employer's wrongful intervention with prospective
employment, or "blacklisting,"59 is expressly prohibited by many states.60
note 43, at 722.
55. Thirty states plus Puerto Rico have enacted some legislation dealing specifically with
termination of employment and the employee reference. MCCULLOCH, TERMINATION OF EM-
PLOYMENT; EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS (P-H) 1 20,066 (1984) (Alaska, Delaware, Dis-
trict of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Vermont, and West Virginia have enacted no statutes
of this kind) [hereinafter TERMINATION]. Thirty-three states plus the District of Columbia
have enacted privacy statutes dealing with some aspect of employee privacy that could re-
late to the employee reference situation. 8 Empl. Coordinator (Research Inst. Am.) 81,857
(May 15, 1985). The states have exclusive power to regulate both the process by which an
employer gathers information about prospective employees as well as the use to which the
employer puts the gathered information. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1971)
(prohibiting private employers from requiring polygraph tests as a condition of employ-
ment); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28 (Repl. Vol. 1986) (prohibiting employers from forcing em-
ployees to pay the cost of medical examinations required as a condition of employment).
56. For example, in Virginia:
No person doing business in this State, or any agent or attorney of such person after
having discharged any employee from the service of such person or after any em-
ployee shall have voluntarily left the service of such person shall willfully and mali-
ciously prevent or attempt to prevent by word or writing, directly or indirectly, such
discharged employee or such employee who has voluntarily left from obtaining em-
ployment with any other person ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-27 (Repl. Vol. 1986) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Malquist v. Foley, 714
P.2d 995 (Mont. 1986) (finding employer's conduct to be "blacklisting per se"); Wright v.
Fiber Indust. Inc., 60 N.C. App. 486, 299 S.E.2d 284 (1983) (employee successfully bringing
suit under blacklisting statute). In addition to Virginia, twenty-five other states have
adopted such statutes. See 12 Empl. Coordinator (Research Inst. Am.) 125,007 (Apr. 21,
1986) (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin all
have statutory provisions dealing with blacklisting). In addition, Kentucky has ruled that an
employer that makes a bad-faith threat to fire an employee and give a bad reference may be
subject to suit by the employee for damages. See Humana, Inc. v. Fairchild, 603 S.W.2d 918
(Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
57. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-27 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
58. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1050 (West 1971).
59. "Blacklist" means a list of individuals marked out for special avoidance, antagonism
or adverse discrimination. State v. Dabney, 77 Okla. Crim. 331, -, 141 P.2d 303, 307-08
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Several blacklisting statutes authorize civil proceedings for enforcement
purposes."1 Other statutes provide criminal sanctions62 to encourage
compliance.
A recent example of the substantial financial penalty imposed on em-
ployers for blacklisting violations is found in Marshall v. Brown.6 3 In
Marshall, the plaintiff employee resigned from her job. She later sought
employment with another company. When a prospective employer called
the former employer for a reference, the inquirer was told that the em-
ployee was "erratic," that she brought her problems to the office and that
she had married a co-worker causing him to have a mental breakdown."4
The plaintiff was not hired. After learning about the conversation, the
plaintiff sued under California's anti-blacklisting statute which provides a
civil remedy for misrepresentations that prevent a worker's prospective
employment.6 5 The jury found that the former employer was liable for
compensatory and punitive damages. A judgment was entered for
$165,000.66
Marshall is just one example of the substantial monetary penalty that
employers will face for blacklisting. The availability of such severe penal-
ties for blacklisting is only one example of the attempts legislatures are
making to regulate employee references.
2. Other Employee Reference Legislation
Legislatures around the country have made efforts to control the refer-
ences given by employers. Several states have expressly allowed employ-
ers to give extensive references as long as they are truthful.6 7 Virginia
(Okla. Crim. App. 1943); see also Dick v. Northern Pac. Ry., 86 Wash. 211, _, 150 P. 8, 12
(1915). According to one state code, a blacklisting may arise from any understanding by
which the name or identity of a person is communicated between two or more employers in
order to prevent the worker from engaging in employment. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361
(1983).
60. For example, Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Nevada, New York,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin have express statutory language
prohibiting "blacklisting." See 8 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR (Research Inst. Am.) 82,933-36
(Sept. 16, 1985).
61. 9 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR (Research Inst. Am.) 99,631 (Jan. 15, 1985) (for example,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma and Texas authorize civil proceedings).
62. Id. at 90,251 (California, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin authorize crimi-
nal sanctions).
63. 141 Cal. App. 3d 408, 190 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1983). For a discussion of this case see
TERMINATION, supra note 55, at V 52,301.
64. Id. 141 Cal. App. 3d at __, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
65. Id.; see supra note 58.
66. For a discussion of the damages assigned and an explanation of their computation, see
TERMINATION, supra note 55, at T 52,301.
67. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1053 (West 1971) (a truthful statement concerning termi-
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allows an employer to make "a truthful statement [upon request] of the
reason for such discharge" and to comment on the "character, industry
and ability of such person who has voluntarily left employment.""8 Most
states require such an employer reference to be in writing.6 9 In Texas, a
former employee is entitled to a complete copy or true statement of any
communication made by his former employer to any employer with whom
he is seeking employment within ten days after a demand in writing is
made.70 Although varying in content, 1 these statutes are evidence of leg-
islatures' attempts to regulate employer references for the benefit of
employees.
3. Service Letter Statutes
As early as 1905, the Missouri legislature had enacted a law which re-
quired employers, upon the request of an employee, to furnish a letter
stating the nature of his employment.72 Service letter statutes, requiring
an employer to give a letter to an employee regarding his services upon
termination of employment, have been enacted in twelve states.7 3 Service
nation of an employee may be furnished, although if the statement conveys information
different from that expressed by its words, there is prima facie evidence that the statute has
been violated); COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-2-114 (1973) ("nothing in [the blacklisting statute] shall
prevent a former employer ... from imparting a fair and unbiased opinion of a workman's
or employee's qualifications when solicited"); see also 8 Empl. Coordinator (Research Inst.
Am.) 11 EP-22,940, -22,948 (Oct. 15, 1984 & Sept. 16, 1985) (listing other similar statutes).
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-27 (Repl. Vol. 1986) (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.1 (West 1979); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5196 § 5
(Vernon 1971).
70. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5196 § 2 (Vernon 1971).
71. For example, in Montana, an employer may not furnish to any prospective employer
the reasons for an employee's discharge if the employer has refused to furnish the employee
with a written statement containing such reasons. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-801 (1985). In
Nevada, upon an employee's demand, an employer must furnish a truthful statement of the
reasons for the discharge or a reference of "meritorious services." NE.v. REV. STAT. §
613.210(4) (1985).
72. For a history of the Missouri Service Letter Statute, see Comment, Missouri's Service
Letter Statute: Its Reach, Effect and Constitutionality, 52 UMKC L. REv. 641 (1984). Ac-
cording to a somewhat typical statute, "[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer ... [t]o
refuse to furnish, upon written request of any employee whose services have been termi-
nated, a service letter setting forth the tenure of employment, occupation classification and
wage rate paid the employee." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-808 (1981). "Most states that provide
for a service letter do not require the letter unless the employee makes a request for such a
letter. Not many employees make such a request." TERMINATION, supra note 55, at 42,101;
see also Worth v. Monsanto Co., 680 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (discussing what con-
stitutes a sufficient request under the Missouri Service Letter Statute).
73. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1055 (West 1971) (applies only to employees of public utilities); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 22-6-3-1, -6-3-2 (Burns Repl. Vol. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-808(3) (1981);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 630 (Supp. 1986); Mo. REV. STAT. § 290.140 (1986); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-801, -802, -803 (1984); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-867 (1985); NEv. REV. STAT. §
613.210 (1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4973.03 (Baldwin 1985) (applies only to railroad
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letters may require an employer to state the reason for an employee's
termination.14 If the employee challenges the contents of the letter, an
employer must be able to prove that anything stated in the letter is
true.75 Employers who violate these statutes may be liable for pre-estab-
lished fines7 6 or for both compensatory and punitive damages.7 7
In Rimmer v. Colt Industries,"s the court stated that the purpose of
such statutes is to assure "that a worker's ability to sell his skills to a
potential employer would not be hampered by a previous employer's re-
fusal to truthfully describe his work history."7 9 While obviously beneficial
to employees,80 service letters have been criticized as placing an unfair
burden on employers."1 In reality, service letters may actually be an inef-
employees); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 171 (West 1986) (pertains only to employees of pub-
lic service corporations and their contractors); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5196 (Vernon
1971); WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. § 296-126-050 (1970). See generally Annotation, Validity,
Construction, and Application of Statute Requiring Employer, on Employee's Request, to
Provide Written Statement of Employee's Service Record and Reason for Termination of
Employment, 24 A.L.R. 4th 1115 (1983) (discussing the construction and application of ser-
vice letter statutes).
74. At common law there was no duty for an employer to provide a letter of recommenda-
tion or "service letter" to any employee he had discharged unless the contract for employ-
ment imposed such a duty. Carr v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 363 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Mo.
1963); see also Egloff v. Wilcox Elec. Co., 529 F. Supp. 190, 192 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (quoting
Carr, 363 S.W.2d at 574), aff'd, 694 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1982). Today a service letter requires
a stated reason for termination of employment. Mo. REV. STAT. § 290.140 (1986).
75. The burden of proof is placed on the employer and the jury determines if the reason
for termination stated in the letter is the true reason. In one case where the employee was
able to recover $25,000 punitive damages, the court stated, "Accordingly, [the employee] has
no burden of proving the true reason for [the] discharge; his burden is negative in character
because such true reason is peculiarly within the knowledge of the employer, and [the]
burden of showing the truth of the asserted reason for discharge is on the employer." El-
mer v. Texaco, Inc., 518 F.2d 807, 810 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting Potter v. Milbank Mfg. Co.,
489 S.W.2d 197, 203 (Mo. 1972)). But see Green v. N.L.T. Computer Serv. Corp., 649
S.W.2d 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (employee needs to prove that the reason given by the
employer is untrue).
76. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-6-3-2, 34-4-32-4 (Burns Repl. Vol. 1986) (failure to
provide a letter is a misdemeanor punishable by fine up to $500).
77. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 290.140 (1986) (punitive damages may be awarded if em-
ployer fails to provide a letter within the required 45 day limit). No punitive damages shall
be based on content of the letter and actual damages are recoverable only when the plaintiff
can show that a prospective employer asked to see the letter and held the letter against
plaintiff. Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 765 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1985).
78. 656 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1981).
79. Id. at 328 (citing Cheek v. Prudential Ins. Co., 192 S.W. 387, 389 (1916)). An addi-
tional purpose of the statute is to help a potential employer "to ascertain the degree of
intelligence, honesty, capacity and efficiency of the job applicant." Rimmer, 656 F.2d at 328
(quoting Cheek, 192 S.W. at 389).
80. "The law is maintained for the benefit of the employee, not subsequent employer."
TERMINATION, supra note 55, at T 42,101.
81. Some questions arise concerning the ethical behavior that these statutes promote. For
example, suppose an employee is dismissed for some suspected unworthy behavior, such as
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fective control on employer conduct due to the limited enforcement of the
statutes.
8 2
4. Access to Personnel Files and References
An area of common legislative concern is the ensuring of a means by
which an employee can gain access to his personnel file. 83 Many states
have recently granted private-sector and public-sector employees the
right to inspect their personnel files . 4 These statutes allow employees to
review, copy and dispute records in their files, but exclude the employees'
dishonesty or theft. If an employee requests a letter and none is given, the employer exposes
himself to punitive damages. If an employer gives a letter detailing his suspicions, he opens
himself up to the possibility of a defamation suit. See supra text accompanying notes 15-41.
If an employee asserts a claim under this statute along with a discrimination charge, he may
win on one or both unless the employer can prove that the reason for termination stated in
the letter is the true reason. See TERMINATION, supra note 55, at 20,063; Comment, supra
note 72, at 664.
82. Unfortunately, employees gain little from the existence of the statute. See Cordon v.
Trans World Airlines, 442 F. Supp. 1064, 1067 (D. Kan. 1977) (even if reasons that are
stated are false, an employee may not bring suit under the service letter statute as long as a
letter has been issued); Vaughan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 708 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1986) (en
banc) (court found defendant employer to have violated statute but awarded only $1.00 in
actual damages); Stark v. American Bakeries Co., 647 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)
(holding that the statement that the employee's "work was unsatisfactory" was too vague to
satisfy the service letter statute but awarded only $1.00 compensatory damages). But see
Neighbors v. Kirksville College, 694 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. App. 1985) (employee was able to
assert a cause of action for defamation based on the contents of the service letter her em-
ployer drafted).
83. "References continue to be a particular target for reform; numerous lawmakers and
commentators have singled them out as a particular infringement on employee rights."
Duffy, supra note 6, at 449 (citing The Report of the Privacy Study Commission (Washing-
ton, D.C.: G.P.O. 1977)); see Walker, Employee Access to Personnel Files: An Emerging
Trend, 1 LAB. & EMPLOYMENT LAW NEWSLETTER No. 6, at 18 (1985); Leech, The Illinois
Personnel Records Statute: New Rights for Employees, New Risks for Employers, 73 ILL.
B.J. 386 (1985).
84. According to one statute, the term "personnel file" includes "any formal or informal
employee evaluations and reports relating to employee's character, credit, work habits, com-
pensation and benefits, and non-privileged medical records . . . relating to the employee
which the employer has in his possession." Mx. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 631 (West Supp.
1985). At least ten states have granted private and/or public sector employees access to their
personnel files. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1198.5 (West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-1286
(West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 719-24 (Repl. Vol. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, 2001 (Smith-Hurd 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-215 (Cum. Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 631 (Supp. 1986); MicH. Comsp. LAws ANN. § 423.503 (West Cum. Supp. 1986);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 613.080 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:56 (Cum. Supp. 1986); OF. REV.
STAT. § 652.750 (Repl. Vol. 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1321-24 (Purdon Supp. 1986);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.12.240 (Cum. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.13 (West Cum. Supp.
1986). Virginia currently has no such legislation. For a good discussion of state laws gov-
erning personnel file data see Menard & Morrill, The Employer and the Law of Privacy in
the Workplace-The U.S. Model to Date, 9 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 93, 102-04 (1983).
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right to view reference letters contained in the file."" However, a few
states have not mandated such an exclusion; thereby allowing an em-
ployee the opportunity to see his former employer's references if kept in
his file."6 As this trend expands and greater access to personnel files and
references is attained,8 7 employers who wrongfully disseminate unfavora-
ble references may be faced with an increasing number of reference
lawsuits.88
B. Regulation by the Federal Government
The federal government has not enacted any legislation specifically
governing employee reference practices.8 9 However, the recently enacted
Fair Credit Reporting Act 0 may expose employers to reference suits initi-
85. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1198.5 (West Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-
128a(3) (West Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.13(6) (West Supp. 1986). These statutes
remove letters of reference received by the employer from "personnel documents" which an
employee shall have a right to review.
86. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 631 (West Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
1322 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
87. "With the recent growth of interest in employee rights, privacy and employment-at-
will issues, it is expected that more states will expand employee's access to their work
records." Walker, supra note 83, at 18. Critics have suggested the need for federal legislation
to establish nationwide uniform policies making an employer liable to an employee for dis-
closure of an employee's personal information. Proponents of this idea have drafted a fed-
eral "Fair Labor Disclosure Act." Duff & Johnson, supra note 5, at 760.
88. Employee access to personnel files will protect employees by allowing them to know
how they have been evaluated and aiding their efforts to redress unfair criticism. Leech,
supra note 83, at 388. At the same time, employers will be exposed to increased liability
resulting from employees disgruntled after reviewing their files. Id. at 390.
Furthermore, many states have enacted Fair Credit Reporting Acts modeled after a simi-
lar federal act. These acts will allow employees to see their references. See infra notes 89-92
and accompanying text.
89. The only federal legislation that is relevant is the Privacy Act of 1974 which is incor-
porated into the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982), and is designed to
safeguard the right of personal privacy against the invasion by agencies that collect and use
personal data. Under the Privacy Act, individuals are guaranteed the right to gain access to
their records. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1). For a more detailed overview of the requirements of the
act see 15 FEDERAL PROCEDURE: LAWYER'S EDITION §§ 38:1-38:348 (Law. Co-op. 1983). For an
analysis of how employee's privacy needs are expressed through federal legislation, see Rei-
nert, Federal Protection of Employment Record Privacy, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 207 (1981).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982).
For a discussion about the disclosure of information under the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
see Menard & Morrill, supra note 84, at 98-100. In addition, several states have enacted
their own version of a fair credit reporting act modeled after the federal version. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1786 (West Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-701 to -722 (1983); MD.
CoM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 14-1110 to -1218 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-3-1 (1978); TEx. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 9016 (Vernon Supp. 1986). For example, Arizona provides that an em-
ployer that makes an adverse employment decision with regard to an individual must,
"upon written request, disclose the name and address of any consumer reporting agency
that has furnished . . . a consumer report ... considered . . .in making the determina-
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ated by employees. By allowing employees to see their current or past
employer's references, 91 the federal government has opened avenues for
employees to have notice of adverse references and to have access to in-
formation needed to bring a reference suit against the employer. For ex-
ample, an executive search firm hired to do research on a person's back-
ground would initiate extensive reference checking. Because of the federal
disclosure requirement, an employee would eventually see what former
employers have said or written.2 An employee upset over what has been
disclosed in the report is likely to bring suit.
V. REFERENCE SUITS BROUGHT BY EMPLOYEES BASED ON TORTIOUS
INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
An employee may seek to hold a former employer liable in tort for in-
terference with prospective employment.9 3 The tort of interference with
employment developed early at common law9 4 to protect a person's "ex-
pectancies"9 5 in obtaining employment. According to the Restatement of
Torts, "[o]ne who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's
prospective contractual relation. . . is subject to liability to the other for
the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation."9 6
However, the employee has the burden of proving that the employer in-
terfered with a reasonable employment prospect.9 7
tion." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1693(A)(3) (West Supp. 1985). Virginia has enacted no
such legislation.
91. The Fair Credit Reporting Act requires that an employee be notified of an investiga-
tion of his credit or personal background and that a copy of this report be made available to
him, if the investigation is made by an outside agency. See, e.g., Fischl v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 708 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983). "[T]he user [a lender or employer] of the
consumer report shall so advise the consumer against whom such adverse action has been
taken and supply the name and address of the consumer reporting agency making the re-
port." Wood v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 508 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §
1681m(a) (1974)).
92. See, e.g., Hoke v. Retail Credit Corp., 521 F.2d 1079 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1087 (1976) (physician brought action against a consumer reporting agency under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act for inaccurate information contained in a report furnished for employ-
ment purposes).
93. See PROSSER, supra note 12, § 130, at 1005-31; 45 AM. Ju. 2D Interference § 51
(1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 374(3) (1958); Annotation, Liability for Inter-
ference with At Will Business Relationship, 5 A.L.R. 4TH 9, § 18(a) (1981); Annotation,
Liability of One Who Induces or Causes Third Person Not to Enter into or Contrive a
Business Relation with Another, 9 A.L.R. 2D 228, § 8 (1950).
94. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 130, at 1005.
95. "[Slince a large part of what is most valuable in modern life depends upon 'probable
expectancies,'. . . courts must ... protect them from undue interference." Id. at 1006 (cit-
ing Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N.J. Eq. 759, 53 A. 230 (1902)).
96. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766(B) (1939).
97. Courts have dismissed claims of interference with prospective employment brought
against employers where the plaintiff-employee failed to sustain his burden. See, e.g.,
Becket v. Welton Becket & Assoc., 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, _, 114 Cal. Rptr. 531, 535 (1974)
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A. Claims Brought Alleging Intentional Interference
The few cases s in the area of alleged employer interference suggest
that a plaintiff must be able to prove that the former employer intended
to interfere with the employee's prospective employment.9 When an em-
ployee is unable to substantiate "malice", as required to prove a defama-
tion claim,100 he may still have a cause of action for interference by dem-
onstrating his former employer's wrongful intent to prevent re-
employment.1° 1
An example of an employer's interference claim is Geyer v. Stein-
bronn.'02 In Geyer, the defendant was held liable for $185,000 in damages
for communicating a false and defamatory employment reference which
caused plaintiff not to be hired by a prospective employer. 1 3 The court
explained that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that there
was a "bad motive" on the part of the defendant. 0 4 Instead, it was suffi-
cient for the jury to infer from the defendant's state of mind and possible
motives that defendant intended to interfere with plaintiff's prospective
contractual relation. °0 5
(employee failed to demonstrate sufficient future economic loss); Schipani v. Ford Motor
Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, __, 302 N.W.2d 307, 314 (1981) (employee failed to demonstrate
interference with a specific business relationship).
98. There are relatively few cases on alleged employer interference. See Scholtes v. Signal
Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Marshall v. Brown, 141 Cal. App. 3d
408, 190 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1983); Owens v. Williams, 322 Mass. 356, 77 N.E.2d 318 (1948);
Willner v. Silverman, 109 Md. 341, 71 A. 962 (1909); Musso v. Miller, 265 A.D. 57, 38 N.Y.S.
2d 51 (1942).
99. See, e.g., Huskie v. Griffin, 75 N.H. 345, -, 74 A. 595, 596 (1909). Plaintiff must show
that he
quit the defendant's employ in an honorable manner; that the defendant, with knowl-
edge of the facts, represented that the plaintiff's departure was dishonorable; that
this was done with the intent to cause the new employer to act to the plaintiff's
damage, and that such damaging action resulted from this cause.
Id. at -, 74 A. at 596; see also Torbett v. Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co., 314 S.E.2d 166
(W. Va. 1983) (discussing claim for tortious interference in the employer-employee context).
100. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
101. Note the close similarity between interference claims and the possible violation of an
anti-blacklisting statute. A plaintiff-employee may be able to assert both at the same time.
See, e.g., Marshall, 141 Cal. App. 3d at -, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 397-98 (plaintiff asserted both
violation of anti-blacklisting statute and interference with prospective employment claim).
102. 506 A.2d 901 (Pa. Super. 1986).
103. Id. at 906-08.
104. Id. at 910.
105. Id. at 910; see also Scholtes, 548 F. Supp. at 496-97 (discussing the elements re-
quired to establish a cause of action for interference with prospective advantage). See gener-
ally PROSSER, supra note 12, § 130, at 1009-12.
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B. Claims Arising Out of Negligent Interference
An employee may prevail against a former employer when the negligent
dissemination of incorrect information leads to interference.1 0 8 A suit for
interference that does not meet the requisite intent of the defendant to
interfere is not impossible, but it must depend on the existence of some
special reason for finding a duty of care.10
A claim based on negligent interference arose in Quinones v. United
States.I0 In Quinones, the plaintiff had willfully terminated his employ-
ment after years of outstanding service as a federal employee.0 9 His ap-
plications for subsequent employment were refused by prospective em-
ployers because they were told, among other incorrect information, that
the plaintiff was "discharged for misconduct." 10 The plaintiff brought
suit alleging a failure to use due care in maintaining his personnel records
resulting in damage to his reputation. The court recognized that a duty to
use due care in keeping and maintaining employment records existed and
held that a cause of action could be maintained for a breach of this
duty."' This duty arose because the federal administrative regulations
governing the maintenance of personnel files "contemplate[d] the dissem-
ination of information to prospective employers and impose[d] certain
safeguards [because] a risk of injury to [an] employee's reputation was
contemplated.'
12
Courts consistently have been willing to recognize an employer's duty
not to wrongfully interfere with an employee's efforts to obtain subse-
quent employment. Consequently, an employee may prevail in an action
against his former employer when the negligent maintenance and dissem-
ination of employee information leads to interference with future employ-
ment opportunities.
106. In other situations, courts have recognized lawsuits for interference based on negli-
gent acts. See PROSSER, supra note 12, § 130, at 1008.
107. Id.
Courts have willingly recognized the employer's duty not to interfere with a former em-
ployee's prospective employment. In Hundley v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 105 Ky. 162, -, 48
S.W. 429, 430 (1898), the court, expressly noting the employer's duty not to interfere with a
former employee's attempts to secure employment, stated, "[t]o deprive [the employee] of
his trade or calling is to condemn, not only him, but perchance a wife and children, to
penury and want. Public interests, humanity, and individual rights, alike, demand the re-
dress of a wrong which is followed by such lamentable consequences."
108. 492 F.2d 1269 (3d Cir. 1974).
109. Id. at 1272 (plaintiff "received several grade promotions, commendations and awards
for the performance of his duties").
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1281.
112. Id. at 1269. Plaintiff also claimed that this interference arose out of defendant's
breach of "duty to accurately represent plaintiff's past employment history to prospective
employers." Id. at 1280-81.
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VI. REFERENCE SUITS FOR MISREPRESENTATION BROUGHT BY EMPLOYEES,
OTHER EMPLOYERS, OR THIRD PARTIES
A. The Basis for a Claim of Misrepresentation Brought by a Subse-
quent Employer
Employers, employees and third parties can bring claims under a the-
ory of misrepresentation.113 Misrepresentation is a distinct tort designed
to compensate an individual for physical harm114 or pecuniary loss"1 5 in-
curred as a result of reliance on false assertions or non-disclosures made
by another party. Employers should clearly be held liable to other em-
ployers for any intentional false assertions,1 ' or willfully failing to convey
all the relevant information about a person who later causes damage or
commits a crime after changing jobs.1 1 7 A lawsuit based on an intentional
misrepresentation may arise, for example, where a doctor leaves his job
after being implicated in connection with a rape charge at the hospital
113. "Misrepresentation" means "any manifestation by words or conduct by one person
to another that, under the circumstances, amounts to an assertion not in accordance with
the facts." Best v. Culhane, 677 S.W.2d 390, 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Pasko v. Trela, 153
Neb. 759, -, 46 N.W.2d 139, 143 (1951); Seavy v. State, 21 A.D.2d 445, -, 250 N.Y.S.2d
877, 880 (1964). For an explanation of misrepresentation as a tort action, see PROSSER, supra
note 12, §§ 105-10, at 725-70.
114. Liability for physical harm as a result of misrepresentation extends to all those who
are likely to be injured by some action taken in reliance upon information given. RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 311 comment b (1965). See generally Note, Tort Liability for
Nonlibelous Negligent Statements: First Amendment Considerations, 93 YALE L.J. 744,
755-56 (1984) (discussing physical harm resulting from unpublished misrepresentations).
115. Liability for pecuniary loss is limited to those individuals for whose benefit and guid-
ance the information was given. See Note, supra note 114, at 754-55.
116. Intentional misrepresentation is often classified as "deceit." See PROSSER, supra note
12, § 105, at 726. Deceit may occur when an employer intentionally gives a false reference
knowing that the prospective employer intends to rely on it. See Kolikof v. Samuelson, 488
F. Supp. 881, 883 (D. Mass. 1980) ("[T]he tort of misrepresentation, requires that the tort-
feasor must 1) know that he is making a false statement and 2) intend to induce reliance of
his victim.").
117. An employer may intentionally give a favorable reference on a former bad employee
or an unfavorable reference on a good employee in order to injure the prospective employer
who happens also to be a business competitor. In other situations, deliberate false assertions
have created liability. See Aimonetto v. Farmers Ins. Group, 291 F. Supp. 777, 778 (D. Wyo.
1968) (representation of a party that he owned a building upon which he was purchasing an
insurance policy, when in fact negotiations for purchase of building were incomplete, was a
"misrepresentation"); Austin v. Wilkerson, Inc., 519 P.2d 899, 904 (Okla. 1974) (turning
back mileage on a used automobile constitutes "misrepresentation" which will support an
action by the buyer of the automobile against the seller).
Additionally, a willful non-disclosure would arise where a former employer intentionally
fails to disclose that an employee was fired because he lacked the requisite skill needed to
perform the job. According to Keeton, courts in recent years have been willing "to find a
duty of disclosure when the circumstances are such that the failure to disclose something
would violate a standard requiring conformity to what the ordinary ethical person would
have disclosed." PROSSER, supra note 12, at 739.
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where he works. He is then employed by a second hospital. The first em-
ployer fails to mention the rape charge when the prospective employer
calls for a reference. When the doctor is implicated in a rape at the sec-
ond hospital, and his prior misconduct is discovered, the second employer
could file suit against the first.11 8
Liability might also be assigned to an employer for negligent misrepre-
sentations. 1 9 A negligent misrepresentation arises from either negligently
asserting an untrue fact 120 or the unintentional failure of an employer to
communicate some relevant characteristic.12' Traditionally, negligent mis-
representations have arisen where one party relied on information com-
municated by another, and thereby suffered economic loss in a bargain
transaction or commercial setting.'2 2 However, in Johnson v. State, 123 the
118. See example cited in Johnson, supra note 1.
119. See PROSSER, supra note 12, § 107, at 745-48; Goodhart, Liability of Innocent but
Negligent Misrepresentations, 74 YALE L.J. 286 (1964). Courts have not explored negligent
misrepresentation in the employer-employee reference context although cases exist in other
areas. See, e.g., French Market Plaza Corp. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 480 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. La.
1979) (fire insurer's duty to provide correct information concerning terms of policy created
basis for cause of action for negligent misrepresentation); Arizona Title Ins. & Trust Co. v.
O'Malley Lumber Co., 14 Ariz. App. 486, 484 P.2d 639 (1971) (title company which informed
contractors that there would be sufficient funds available to pay them for their work was
liable for negligent misrepresentation even though it had no duty to speak since it had duty
to exercise reasonable care in making representations about ascertainable facts); Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (accountants held liable for negligently
made report on which plaintiff relied); Thurber v. Russ Smith, Inc., 128 Vt. 216, 260 A.2d
390 (1969) (negligent misrepresentation by a garage to automobile owner that car was in
perfect operating condition was actionable).
Critics speculate that to allow claims for negligent misrepresentation is to create "unlim-
ited liability" because of a "momentary lapse from proper care." Beeck v. Kapalis, 302
N.W.2d 90, 97 (Iowa 1981) (quoting PROSSER, supra note 12, at 708); see also Ultramares
Corp. at 170, 174 N.E.2d at 444 (the court expressed concern over "liability in an indetermi-
nate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class"). See generally Note,
Negligent Misrepresentation: A New Trap for the Unwary?, 27 Loy. L. REv. 1184 (1981)
(discussing the serious implications of holding employers liable for their negligent
misrepresentations).
120. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Blum, 529 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975) (patient brought
action to recover against a treating physician on a theory that physician negligently diag-
nosed him and misrepresented extent of injuries thereby causing patient to settle his claim
for damages against insurance company for a lesser sum than he would have otherwise).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961) (buyer of home who relied
on FHA appraisal of home and later discovered foundation was inadequate, relied on theory
of negligent misrepresentation seeking recovery).
122. Id. at 706.
123. 69 Cal. 2d at 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
Liability in [a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation] arises only where there
is a duty, if one speaks at all, to give the correct information . . . . There must be
knowledge, or its equivalent, that the information is desired for a serious purpose;
that he to whom it is given intends to rely and act upon it; that, if false or erroneous,
he will because of it be injured in person or property. Finally, the relationship of the
parties, arising out of contract or otherwise, must be such that in morals or good
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court upheld a foster mother's action for negligent misrepresentation
when she was assaulted by a boy placed in her home by state youth au-
thorities. The foster mother had relied on the state youth authorities to
volunteer any necessary warnings regarding the character of the youth
she was to take into her home. 124 The court held that legal redress was
available for defendant's failure to give reasonable warnings of the "homi-
cidal tendencies, and . . . background of violence" of the youth.1 25 Like-
wise, failure of an employer to disclose the negative qualities of a former
employee may create liability for any resulting harm to third parties, al-
though the law is unexplored on this issue.1 26
B. The Basis for a Claim of Misrepresentation Brought by a Former
Employee
An employee may also be able to successfully assert a cause of action
for negligent misrepresentation 12 7 against a former employer. The em-
ployer's liability arises from the fact that there is a relationship between
the employer and the former employee such that "in morals and good
conscience," the employee is justified in relying on his employer to exer-
cise reasonable care in giving out information about him.12 8 For example,
in Zampatori v. United Parcel Service,129 all the elements 30 required to
conscience the one has the right to rely upon the other for information; and the other
giving information owes a duty to give it with care.
International Prod. Co. v. Erie R.R. Co., 224 N.Y. 331, 338, 155 N.E. 662, 664, cert. denied,
275 U.S. 527 (1927), as found in Bivas v. State, 97 Misc. 2d 524, -, 411 N.Y.S.2d 854, 857
(Ct. Cl. 1978).
124. Johnson, 69 Cal. 2d at -, 447 P.2d at 355, 73 Cal. Rptr. at -.
125. Id. at __, 447 P.2d at 354, 73 Cal. Rptr. at _.
126. "Attorneys say the law is largely unexplored on this issue, which might typically
involve one company suing another for failing to convey all the relevant information about a
person." Johnson, supra note 1, at 8.
127. It is unlikely that a cause of action for intentional misrepresentation could be as-
serted by an employee against his former employer because in order to assert such an ac-
tion, the plaintiff must be the party who was intended to rely on the misrepresentation.
PROSSER, supra note 12, at 741-45. Consequently, the cause of action for intentional misrep-
resentation most likely lies with the subsequent employer. If the employee wants to bring
action on the intentional misrepresentation of his former employer to a potential employer,
the situation arising from the publication of false information to a third party would be
more fitting for an action based on defamation or interference with prospective advantage
(injurious falsehood). See, e.g., Bivas, 97 Misc. 2d at -, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
128. Bivas, 97 Misc. 2d at -, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 857-58 (holding that a cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation requires the finding of a duty to supply correct information
based on the relationship between the parties). In Bivas, the court found that the former
student of a college was justified in asserting a cause of action for negligent misrepresenta-
tion against the college based on the plaintiff's right to rely on the college exercising due
care in giving out correct information concerning completion of requirements for a degree in
response to inquiries from prospective employers. 97 Misc. 2d at -, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 858.
129. 125 Misc. 2d 405, 479 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
130. The necessary elements required in an action for negligent misrepresentation are:
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support an action for negligent misrepresentation were met where the
employee was discharged after his employer relied on the negligent mis-
representations of a private detective agency falsely accusing the em-
ployee of theft, even though no privity existed between the employee and
the detective agency.131 Holding that the lack of privity between the em-
ployee and the detective agency would not prevent the employee from
proceeding with his action, the court reasoned that liability did not arise
from the parties relationship but instead from the common-law duty "to
act and to speak with care" so as not to injure another.132 Similarly, an
employer may be subjected to a suit by a former employee who was in-
jured as a result of negligent misrepresentations given to a prospective
employer. 133
C. Employer's Liability to Third Parties Arising from Misrepresenta-
tions to a Prospective Employer
A third party may also hold an employer liable for misrepresentations
occurring during a reference inquiry. For instance, in Gutzan v. Altair
Airlines, Inc., 234 an employee who was raped by a co-worker with a prior
rape conviction filed suit against both the employer and the party that
(1) knowledge or its equivalent that the information is required for a serious purpose;
(2) that the party to whom it is given intends to rely and act upon it;
(3) injury in person or property because of such reliance; and
(4) the relationship of the parties, arising out of contract or otherwise, is such that in
morals or good conscience, one party has the right to rely upon the other for informa-
tion and the other owed a duty to give it with care.
Id. at -, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 472 (citing International Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R. Co., 244 N.Y.
331, 338, 155 N.E. 662, 664, cert. denied, 275 U.S. 527 (1927)).
131. In Zampatori, the question considered by the New York Supreme Court on motion
for summary judgment was "whether an employee who does not himself rely upon a negli-
gent misrepresentation but who claims to have been directly affected because of his em-
ployer's reliance thereon, may bring an action for damages claimed to have been suffered as
a result." Id. at -, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 471. The court stated that this question was one of first
impression. Id.
132. Id. at -, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
133. Contra Graney Dev. Corp. v. Taksen, 92 Misc. 2d 764, 400 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1978) (de-
cided same year but prior to Zampatori). In Taksen, the negligently made statement was
not made to the plaintiff but to a third person and it was not the plaintiff who relied on the
statement. Based on these facts, the court held that the plaintiff could not recover under a
theory of negligent misrepresentation because a recovery should only be allowed where the
misrepresentation is negligently communicated to one who relies upon it to his damage. Id.
at -, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 719. According to the court, "[i]f the doctrine of negligent misrepre-
sentation can apply to this case where slander is also a remedy, the elements of the tort of
slander will be radically changed ... [and] the doctrine of qualified privilege will be abol-
ished." Id. at -, 400 N.Y.S. 2d at 718. This assumption is drawn from the conclusion that
if negligence, rather than malice, becomes the predicate for liability, the qualified privilege
presently granted to an employer making statements about his employee to a person who is
considering hiring that employee would be lost.
134. 766 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1985).
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had referred the known rapist to the employer. 35 Although the co-worker
had been employed for approximately one year prior to the rape in this
case, the jury determined that the "plaintiff's injur[ies were] caused by
the negligence of both defendants. '138 In deciding for the plaintiff, the
court held that "one who negligently gives false information to a party"
may be liable for "physical harm to a third party" caused when the recip-
ient of the information places "reasonable reliance on it" and unknow-
ingly hires a person with dangerous propensities. 3 ' The employer was not
held solely liable because the "decision to hire . . . [the rapist and] to
afford him no special supervision" was apparently founded on "unwar-
ranted assumption[s]" and reassurances from the party that referred the
worker "that he posed no danger to . . . fellow workers."'138
Due to the important informational link between employers, former
employers can expect to be sued when a misleading reference leads to a
negligent hiring suit brought by a third party.139 Employers are becoming
more likely to file suits over faulty references as they are increasingly be-
ing held liable for the tort of negligent hiring.140
135. Id. at 136 (the party who referred the dangerous worker was an employment agency).
But see Janssen v. American Hawaiian Cruises, Inc., 731 P.2d 163 (Haw. 1987) (former
ship's waiter who had been sexually assaulted by ship's former chef unsuccessfully sued
former employer and union which had referred chef for employment).
136. Gutzan, 766 F.2d at 139.
137. Id. at 139-41. The court relied on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 311, 324A
(1965), holding that "a defendant ... that negligently performs a service or makes a mis-
representation involving a risk of physical harm to a third person, may be liable for the
injury." Id. at 140; see also Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (physician
held liable to third party in negligence for failure to warn patient who later caused automo-
bile accident about the effects of drugs the physician prescribed which later contributed to
patient causing plaintiff's injuries).
138. Gutzan, 766 F.2d at 141. Interestingly, the court held that "the lapse of one year
alone would not be sufficient for a finding that a duty [to protect the employee] had shifted
[to the employer alone]." Id.
139. By redistributing liability to the source of the wrongful reference (most likely a for-
mer employer), the law places responsibility on the party that did know the negative
propensities of the employee and failed to prevent the eventual resulting damage or criminal
conduct. "[T]here is [a] general belief that victims suffering a loss because someone's failure
to supply correct information should be compensated." Note, Negligent Misrepresentation:
A New Trap for the Unwary?, 27 Loy. L. Rzv. 1184, 1184 (1981).
140. Courts are recently experiencing a rebirth of the tort of negligent hiring and reten-
tion. See Comment, Torts-Negligent Hiring and Retention-Availability of Action Lim-
ited by Foreseeability Requirement, F & T Co. v. Woods, 10 N.M. L. REv. 491 (Summer
1980); Negligent Hiring: Employers Liability for Acts of an Employee, 7 AM. Jun. TRIAL
ADVOCACY 603, 604 n.7 (1984) (listing 27 states that recognize a negligent hiring cause of
action); see also Becken v. Manpower, Inc., 532 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1976) (establishing negli-
gent hiring tort in Illinois where employer hired two felons to move contents of a jewelry
store); Pontiacs v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983) (Minnesota recognizes
negligent hiring-case of first impression); F & T. Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M. 697, 594 P.2d 745
(1979) (New Mexico recognizes this tort for the first time). Virginia courts have not yet
recognized this tort.
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Employers have been held liable for the acts of their employees based
on claims of negligence' 41 in ascertaining those deficiencies which should
have revealed a potential for causing harm to others.14 2 An employer is
expected to make an adequate investigation into a prospective employee's
work history and background. 143 An important element of any negligent
hiring claim is whether the employer had actual or constructive notice of
the employee's incompetence. 144 Where an injured plaintiff is unable to
The tort of negligent hiring is based on the liability of an employer for placing a person
with known dangerous propensities in a position where he can be a threat to others. See,
e.g., Henderson v. Nolting First Mortgage Corp., 184 Ga. 724, -, 193 S.E. 347, 353 (1937);
Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co., 192 Kan. 360, -, 388 P.2d 824, 829 (1964). Therefore, a
plaintiff must prove that an employer breached his duty of care in selection or retention of
the servant. Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 556, -, 46 N.W.2d 382, 384 (1951). See gener-
ally Loftus, Employer's Duty to Know Deficiencies of Employees, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV.
143 (1967); Note, The Responsibility of Employers for the Actions of Their Employees:
The Negligent Hiring Theory of Liability, 53 CHL [-] KENT L. REV. 717 (1977); Comment,
Torts-Master and Servant-Negligent Hiring-Employer Owes a Duty to the General
Public to Use Reasonable Care in Hiring and Retaining Employees, Evans v. Morsell, 9 U.
BALT. L. REV. 435 (1980) (includes discussion of prima facie elements of the tort as devel-
oped through case authority); Comment, Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entrustment: The
Case Against Exclusion, 52 OR. L. REv. 296 (1973); Comment, Torts-Recognition of Negli-
gent Hiring Expands Employer Liability-Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 10 Wm. MITCH-
ELL L. REV. 361 (1984); 53 Am. JUR. 2D Master & Servant § 422 (1970);RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 307 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958); Annotation,
Liability of Employer, Other Than Carrier, for a Personal Assault Upon Customer, Patron
or Other Invitee, 34 A.L.1.2d 372, 390 (1954).
141. The employer's liability is based on his own primary negligence. Porter v. Grennan
Bakeries, 219 Minn. 14, -, 16 N.W.2d 906, 909-10 (1944) (negligent hiring does not require
the act of the employee to trigger liability). See generally PROSSER, supra note 12, § 71, at
469-70.
142. See, e.g., Stewart Warner Corp. v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1387
(1973) (plaintiff sued for value of goods destroyed in a fire set by a security guard employed
by defendant). The extent of an employer's liability can be quite far reaching. See, e.g.,
Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (employer-landlord was held
liable for murder of a tenant committed by the employee janitor. This indicates the extent
of liability for negligent hiring that will be imposed when the conduct of the employee is far
beyond what might reasonably be foreseen as the scope of employment).
143. See, e.g., Abott v. Payne, 457 So.2d 1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Weiss v. Furni-
ture in the Raw, 62 Misc. 2d 283, 306 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Civ. Ct. 1969) (it is unreasonable for an
employer to fail to conduct a pre-employment investigation; such failure constitutes a
breach of the employment duty); see also Welsh Mfg. Div. of Textron v. Pinkerton's, Inc.,
474 A.2d 436, 441 (R.I. 1984) (court noted that not only was the employer under a duty to
check references, but because "job applicants generally produce references who are certain
to produce favorable reports." the employer should check and seek other relevant informa-
tion that might not otherwise be uncovered.) But see Evans v. Morsell, 284 Md. 160, -,
395 A.2d 480, 484 (1978) (an employer ordinarily has no duty to check into the criminal
record of a prospective employee).
144. See Slaton v. B & B Gulf Serv. Center, 178 Ga. App. 701, 344 S.E.2d 512 (1986)
(Employers were not liable for negligently hiring employee who assaulted customer absent
evidence employer knew, or should have known, of the employees alleged violent propensi-
ties. Employers prior reference check on employee was sufficient to show no knowledge of
employee's nature.); see also Note, Torts-Master and Servant-Negligent Hir-
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successfully assert a claim for negligent hiring based on an inability to
show that the employer "knew or should have known"" 5 of the em-
ployee's dishonest or dangerous propensities, the plaintiff may alterna-
tively seek to hold a previous employer liable for misrepresentation aris-
ing out of the inaccurate references given to the current employer.
VII. CONCLUSION
"[A] memo came down from the eighth floor personnel department
... . Henceforth, it read, managers are not to talk to anyone calling to
ask about employees . . . . The policy was firm, dates of employment,
and job titles only. No opinions.""'
The "standard" reference policy of most employers has become, in ef-
fect, a "no" reference policy. 4 ' This approach has developed because re-
quests for information about employees put employers in a double bind.
If an employer responds to requests for information by doing anything
more than verifying factual information1 48 about the employee, such as
ing-Employer Owes a Duty to the General Public to Use Reasonable Care in Hiring and
Retaining Employees: Evans v. Morsell, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 435, 442-44 (1980) (discussing
the element of whether an employer knew or should have known of the deficiency). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 comment d (1958).
145. In several cases, an employer was not held liable for the tort of negligent hiring
because the plaintiff was not able to show that the employer "knew or should have known"
of the negative characteristics of the employee. Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Slaton, 178 Ga. App. 701, 344 S.E.2d 512 (1986); Edwards v. Robinson-
Humphrey Co., 164 Ga. App. 876, -, 298 S.E.2d 600, 603 (1982) (employer not liable where
employees misstatements in employment application showed employer only that employee
had a propensity for lying, not for the violent behavior for which plaintiff was seeking to
hold employer liable); Welsh Mfg., Div. of Textron v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 474 A.2d 436, 440
(R.I. 1984).
An employer may avoid liability for negligent hiring by plaintiff's failure to substantiate
that the employer "knew or should have known" of the employee's violent tendencies. Sla-
ton, 178 Ga. App. at -, 344 S.E.2d at 514. For example, in Slaton, the employer stated
that they "communicated with [the employee's] former employers and references and [were]
told that [the employee] was a trustworthy employee who had no known problems." Id. In
this situation, if the employee was known to be dangerous, the plaintiff might be able to
assert a cause of action for misrepresentation against the parties who gave false references.
See supra text accompanying notes 133-37.
146. Johnson, supra note 1, at 8.
147. Duffy, supra note 16, at 444.
148. Without signed authorization from the employee, an employer should comment on
no more than a former employee's job title, salary, and employment dates. [Employ. Alert]
EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR 4 (May 16, 1985) (suggesting that a prospective employer send a
signed release relating to defamation liability from the employee along with the request for
information); 8 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR (Research Inst. Am.) 82,933 (Oct. 15, 1984) (sug-
gesting that an employer include release forms in the employment application asking the
applicant to release both the requestor and provider of past employment information from
liability for defamation and interference).
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job title and salary, there is a risk of a lawsuit by a disgruntled employee.
This challenge can take the form of a defamation suit, an interference
with prospective employment claim, an alleged blacklisting violation or a
discrimination charge.
Alternatively, if the former employer fails to disclose information that
could alert a prospective employer to some undesirable trait of a worker,
the former employer might be open to a misrepresentation suit filed by a
future employer or a third party injured by the worker. Incorrect verifica-
tion of factual personal information concerning an employee can lead to a
suit by the employee for interference or by the future employer for
misrepresentation.
An employer's safest course is a policy of limited disclosure. 149 Only in
situations where an employer could reasonably foresee a risk of physical
or monetary harm to others as a result of hiring the individual in ques-
tion should any factual information concerning an employee's background
be disseminated by the employer. Employers can take precautions to pro-
tect themselves from the threat of future employee reference law suits by
keeping opinions about the employee out of any references.1 50 An out-
growth of this advice is the development of an employers "no" reference
policy.
Kyle E. Skopic
149. TERMINATION, supra note 55, at 1 52,301; [Employ. Alert] EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR
4 (May 16, 1985); Johnson, supra note 1; see also Lekich v. International Business Machs.,
Corp., 469 F. Supp. 485, 489 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (former employee could not maintain action for
either defamation or intentional interference with prospective employment where employer
released only employee's dates of employment and position to prospective employer); Buf-
folino v. Long Island Sav. Bank, No. 1908E (N.Y. App. Div. Jan. 12, 1987) (available Feb.
22, 1987, on LEXIS, States library, Omni file). In Buffolino, plaintiff brought an action for
defamation based on a letter of reference sent by the defendant employer to a prospective
employer which merely provided the dates of employment along with a statement that it is
the defendant's policy to provide no other information to a potential employer. The letter
further stated that "[the] failure to comment on an individual's character does not reflect on
the individual." The court held that the "letter can in no reasonable manner be construed
as impugning [the employee's] character or reputation" and therefore could not support a
cause of action for defamation. Id.
150. As an added measure of protection, the employer may request that the employee
sign a statement releasing the employer and any provider of information from liability in
connection with the disclosure of information. For example:
I authorize [the Employer] to make any investigation of my personal or employ-
ment history and authorize any former employer, person, firm, corporation, credit
agency, or government agency to give [the Employer] any information they may have
regarding me. In consideration of [the Employer's] review of this application, I re-
lease [the Employer] and all providers of information from any liability as a result of
furnishing and receiving this information.
Geslewitz, Reviewing Personnel Practices and Documents to Avoid the Risk of Litigation,
32 PRAc. LAW. 75, 78 (Jan. 1986).
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